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Abstract: 
 
The South African land reform programme has been widely criticised for its slow pace as well as its 
apparent lack of contribution to poverty reduction. No econometric evidence of the impact of land 
transfers has been provided to date and this paper attempts to fill this gap by considering the 
impact of receiving a land grant on households’ food insecurity. Propensity score matching and 
univariate probit estimates using two national household surveys indicate that, on average, land 
grant recipients are more food insecure than comparable non-participants. Recursive bivariate 
probit estimates suggest that selection bias is not driving this result.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Long before Apartheid began, the Land Act (1913) initiated the process of confinement of 
the black population of South Africa into specific areas which represented less than 10% of the 
country’s land, away from the cities and farms of the White. As a consequence of this policy and 
the many that followed, the majority of the population were concentrated in overcrowded reserves. 
Post-Apartheid South Africa was therefore confronted with the glaring need for the previously 
disadvantaged to be provided with land access for housing purposes, agricultural, and non-
agricultural activities. A three-component land reform policy was devised, with the aim to 
redistribute 30% of the country’s agricultural land from white landowners to black people. The 
restitution component was to tackle the legal claims of people who were dispossessed of their land 
after 1913. Land tenure reform was aimed at securing people’s land rights to the land they already 
occupied on an informal basis. Finally, the redistribution component was intended as the main 
instrument of this ambitious land reform, and consisted of distributing land grants allowing black 
people to buy land from white willing-sellers. The scope of the latter component was wide-ranging, 
as it aimed to “include the urban and rural very poor, labour tenants, farm workers as well as new 
entrants to agriculture” “for residential and productive uses, to improve their livelihoods and quality 
of life” (Department of Land Affairs, 1997). 
Land reform was not only seen as the “central and driving force of a programme of rural 
development” (African National Congress, 1994), but also by many observers as a crucial measure 
for the development of the country as a whole. Binswanger et al. (1993), for instance, suggest that 
“substantive and rapid market-assisted land reform and resettlement is the greatest if not the only 
hope of peaceful development in South Africa”. But nearly 15 years after the emergence of the 
‘new South Africa’ the actual rate of redistribution has fallen short of expectations and there are 
doubts regarding the achievement of the programme’s expected welfare outcomes.   
Although much has been written about the impact of land redistribution in South Africa, no 
econometric evidence has been provided so far, probably due to data scarcity. Using data from two 
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national surveys carried out by the national statistics agency (Statistics South Africa), this paper 
aims to fill this lacuna by estimating the impact of having benefited from a land grant on the 
household’s self-reported food insecurity. 
In South Africa, where 43% of the population suffer from food poverty (Rose et al., 2002), 
food security was identified as the “primary determinant of the well-being of people directly 
affected by land reform” in the Quality of Life Survey commissioned by the Department of Land 
Affairs to evaluate the impact of land reform (Ahmed et al., 2003). Therefore, an important 
dimension of the livelihoods improvement expected from land reform is food security, or the ability 
of all the household members to “at all times have physical, social and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy life” (FAO, 2001). Over and above its immediate impact on wellbeing, malnutrition has 
substantial long term effects on health, which in turn affect productivity and income at both the 
micro- and macroeconomic levels (see Weil, 2007). This explains the special attention given to 
hunger in the first UN Millennium Goal of halving the proportion of people below the one dollar a 
day poverty line and halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. In the face of the 
alarming trend in world food prices, the latter goal has recently received renewed attention. 
This paper investigates the effect of land redistribution on household food insecurity through 
the use of two surveys. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) allows us to consider the impact on the 
probability for households to have experienced “difficulties in satisfying their food needs” during 
the 12 months preceding the survey, whilst data from the General Household Survey (GHS) permits 
considering the impact on the probability for children and/or adults to have gone “hungry because 
there was not enough food” in the 12 months preceding the survey. 
Section 2 presents the theoretical background and relevant existing evidence, Section 3 
describes the data, Section 4 details the econometric approach, Section 5 contains the estimation 
results, which are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. THEORY AND EXISTING EVIDENCE 
(a) The poverty-reduction impact of land redistribution at the household 
level: theory and international evidence 
It is widely accepted that improved access to land is good for the poor, in particular in terms 
of food security. There are many arguments supporting the idea that food insecurity may be reduced 
through broadening land access, especially if increased land ownership rather than just land use is 
achieved. Firstly, income should increase with land access by the direct income value of additional 
production or renting out of land. In the presence of labour market constraints, increased land 
access should also increase returns to family labour. Furthermore, improved land ownership may 
relax credit constraints and hence allow households to undertake profitable but lumpy investments, 
therefore preventing them from remaining stuck in a ‘poverty trap’ or, from the perspective of 
endogenous class formation models, in a lower income class1. Increased land ownership should also 
help to reduce vulnerability to shocks, due to the larger savings and enhanced insurance access 
enabled by higher income and, if land is a liquid asset, through the ability to sell this asset in the 
face of a shock. Finally, a change in the property rights over land on which a household is already 
producing may improve the household’s returns to the land by making them the residual claimants. 
Ultimately, food security is expected to be enhanced by land redistribution indirectly, through 
higher and/or more secure income, but also directly when food markets are imperfect. 
The idea that broader access to land, and, a fortiori, that broader land ownership is good for 
the poor is therefore largely supported by economic theory. However, the literature on land reform 
has been dominated by debate about the existence of an inverse relationship between farm size and 
productivity (as remarked by Carter, 2003 and Besley et al., 2000) and hence the possibility of 
achieving agricultural efficiency as well as equity through land redistribution, rather than by the 
                                                 
1 A highly influential example is Eswaran and Kotwal (1986); the type of activity carried out by the household depends 
on the availability of working capital, which is in turn an increasing function of wealth as proxied by land ownership. 
 6
question of the actual impact of land redistribution on its beneficiaries. Evidence is especially rare 
at the household level due to data scarcity. Using panel data for Indian states between 1958 and 
1992, Besley et al. (2000) find that land reform has decreased poverty at the state level, but this 
appears to be due to a change in production relations rather than to land redistribution. However, a 
recent study of land reform in India by Deininger et al. (2007) finds that actual redistribution has 
had no effect on education but did significantly increase income, consumption and physical assets at 
the household level. The existence of a panel dataset of land reform beneficiaries for Zimbabwe has 
allowed several evaluation studies to be carried out. They constitute the only published instances of 
econometric analyses of the effect of land reform at the household level. The latest estimation 
exercise based on this data is Deininger et al. (2004). Matching Zimbabwean households who 
resettled in the early 1980s with a control group of rejected applicant households, these authors find 
that participation in land reform increased per capita expenditure by US$172 per year in 1997-1999. 
With the recent reappearance of land redistribution as a priority in the development policy 
agenda, as illustrated by the publication in 2003 of a “Land Policies for Growth and Poverty 
Reduction” report by the World Bank (Deininger, 2003) and the late wave of vast land reforms in 
Colombia, Brazil, and South Africa, it seems essential to monitor closely the impact of recent or 
ongoing land redistribution programs on their beneficiaries. In addition, given the current concerns 
with international food scarcity, it is important to investigate the impact that policies such as land 
reform can have on food security. 
(b) Land Redistribution in South Africa  
The theory and international evidence on the impact of land redistribution on its direct 
beneficiaries is a useful yardstick for the South African case, but the specificity of the South 
African context is worth emphasising for at least four reasons. First, the main tool for the transfer of 
land ownership, namely the land redistribution component, encompasses a disparate set of needs, 
                                                 
2 This corresponds to about 10% of the mean yearly expenditure for land reform beneficiaries as reported in Deininger 
et al. (2004). 
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since it “aims to provide the disadvantaged and the poor with access to land for residential and 
productive purposes. Its scope includes the urban and rural very poor, labour tenants, farm workers 
as well as new entrants to agriculture” (Department of Land Affairs, 1997).3 In addition to this 
diversity of needs, the South African context also differs from the typical land reform environment 
because of the lack of farming human capital among the targeted group (Cross et al., 1996; 
Bradstock, 2005), which comes as a consequence of the impossibility of practicing agriculture on a 
substantial scale in the former reserves.4 Third, often long distances separate the beneficiaries’ 
current place of residence and the land of which they acquire ownership. Fourth, as up to mid-2001, 
beneficiaries were only given about R15,000 per household, whilst commercial farms have evolved 
to be generally quite large due to past agricultural policies, beneficiaries had to pool their grants and 
acquire farms as an entity of anything up to several hundreds of households. Indeed, subdivision of 
farmland is still restricted in South Africa (see van den Brink et al. 2006). Despite a policy change 
in 2001, since which the amount of the individual grant can go up to R100,000 if a beneficiary 
contributes R400,000, pooling is still the rule as most applicants bring none or very little financial 
contribution and legal barriers to subdivision imply that most farms on sale are too large for 
acquisition by single individuals.     
In the light of these specificities, it is especially important to investigate empirically the 
impact of land redistribution on its beneficiaries, since the multiplicity of policy objectives assigned 
to a single instrument (land grants), the lack of farming experience and familiarity with the land 
obtained, the distance problem, and the collective nature of the ownership of most redistributed 
land, are likely to offset at least some of the expected benefits from land transfers. 
To date, less than 5% of the country’s land has been redistributed under the land reform 
programme (Lahiff, 2007), as opposed to the initial target of redistributing 30% of the country’s 
                                                 
3 This particularity is not unique to the South African land reform programme. Targeting on equally broad grounds 
occurred within the Zimbabwean land reform (see Owens et al., 2003).  
4 As a consequence, 58% of the beneficiary population aged 15 years and older surveyed in Ahmed et al. (2003) did not 
have any farming experience before accessing the land reform project (p. 34). 
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agricultural land by 1999. As well as the lack of actual redistribution, doubts have been raised with 
respect to the impact of land redistribution on the livelihoods of its beneficiaries. Indeed, benefiting 
from land redistribution does not seem to be contributing to the livelihoods of a substantial share of 
the households involved: in 2001, no more than 34% of projects surveyed by the Department of 
Land Affairs paid any salary to land grant holders working on the project, even when they worked 
full-time (Ahmed et al., 2003). In addition, only 8.1% of the beneficiary households surveyed by 
Ahmed et al. (2003) report achieving a higher income, and only 11.1% achieving a more secure 
income as a consequence of participation in land redistribution. In his case studies in the Northern 
Cape, Bradstock (2005) finds that while household incomes have increased during the period of 
observation (2001-2003), agricultural income from land redistribution is not the cause of this 
increase. In his study of communal land redistribution projects (Communal Property Associations) 
carried out between 1999 and 2001 in Limpopo, McCusker (2002) finds that “change in livelihoods 
as a result of land reform [is] minimal largely due to general disorganization, farm size problems, 
lack of capital, lack of skills and labour, gender bias, and skewed age distribution” (p.113). More 
specifically, he reports that only 21.1% feel that their income has increased, whereas 55.8% of 
respondents find that their income has stayed the same, and, more worryingly, 23.1% find that it has 
dropped (McCusker 2002, p. 117). Citing an unpublished report elaborated for the Department of 
Land Affairs (May et al., 2000), Andrew et al. (2003b) state that "in many projects, no production is 
happening and some beneficiaries are worse-off". Indeed, many beneficiaries do not use their 
redistributed land for productive purposes. Several factors can account for this phenomenon, 
including coordination problems between co-beneficiaries, lack of know-how and other 
complementary resources, discouragement, and/or because they were simply used by the project 
leaders to make-up the needed numbers to obtain enough grants to cover the price of the farm. The 
impression that benefits are generally small or non-existent is confirmed by Lodge (2003), Aliber 
(2003), and van den Brink (2006). In the only academic study providing numerical evidence on the 
actual revenue for participants in land reform projects, Deininger et al. (2000) find that the median 
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gross annual revenue per beneficiary (incomes minus expenditures on variable inputs, divided by 
beneficiary group size) is equal to R10,552 in the 16% of land reform projects classified as “high-
revenue” – this corresponds more or less to the annual agricultural minimum wage. But for the 
remaining 84% of projects surveyed, the median gross annual revenue per beneficiary is in fact 
slightly negative (-R9). Given the average size of “high-” and “low-revenue” projects (9.14 and 
27.56, respectively) in Deininger et al. (2000), this suggests that, for a large majority of 
beneficiaries in their sample, there is no positive profit to be distributed between land, labour and 
management, thus indicating that only a small minority of beneficiaries could be expected to obtain 
an income from their project at that early stage. 
In addition, there are more specific concerns regarding the ability of the poor to benefit from 
land reform. These concerns have been strongly reinforced since 2001 with the shift away from 
SLAG (Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant) towards LRAD (Land Redistribution for 
Agricultural Development) grants. SLAG was a uniform R15,000 (and later R16,000) grant subject 
to households earning no more than R1500 per month,5 whereas LRAD is a scheme allowing any 
black individual to apply for a land-purchase grant that increases (in absolute terms) with their own 
contribution.6 Even before LRAD was introduced, concerns had been raised about the cost for the 
poor of relocating to the land acquired. Zimmerman (2000) argues that these costs are likely to have 
a deterrent effect on participation, but they can also be thought of as preventing the poor from 
generating income from any newly acquired land. For instance, Bradstock (2005) and Wegerif 
(2004) emphasise the cost to households of travelling to their agricultural land. Furthermore, some 
suspect that the benefits from land redistribution may have disproportionately profited an “élite” 
group. Bradstock (2005) finds inequitable access to land, with the project’s richest tercile having a 
                                                 
5 It is important to note, however, that when groups applied for land grants jointly, which was invariably the case before 
2001, this means testing was applicable to the group average, not to each individual. This allowed for a substantial 
number of people with a much higher income to participate in the scheme. 
6 LRAD grants range from R20,000 for a personal contribution of R5000 (possibly under the form of labour, the so-
called ”sweat equity”) up to R100,000 for a personal contribution of R400,000 (Department of Land Affairs, 2005). 
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mean holding five times larger than that of the other terciles (p.1985). In addition, Hall et al. (2003) 
report that in the Western Cape, LRAD beneficiaries at the bottom of the grant scale have accessed 
3 hectares of land on average, as opposed to 88 hectares for “well-resourced” beneficiaries. Cross et 
al. (1996) mention instances of power manipulation by the communities’ élite, who used the 
opportunity of being turned into land administrators to appropriate land (p.153). And Wegerif 
(2004) suggests that, despite many of Limpopo LRAD beneficiaries being mainly poor, “they were 
not without useful connections” which were crucial for their participation in land redistribution 
(p.37). However, Deininger et al. (2000) draw different lessons about the programme’s targeting. 
Using data from a national survey conducted in 1999 on 1,168 randomly selected beneficiaries in 87 
land reform projects and comparing these with the Black part of the 1993 PSLDS survey carried out 
by SALDRU,7 they argue that the land reform programme was well targeted at the poorest and most 
vulnerable, although this view is not consensual (Sender et al., 2004). With respect to the impact of 
participation rather than the programme’s targeting, and contrary to most commentators, it is 
interesting to note that Deininger et al. (2000) find that the share of expenditure-poor beneficiaries 
is significantly higher in high-revenue projects (81.4%) compared to unsuccessful projects (73.7%), 
suggesting that poorer participants may be more likely to derive benefits from participation when 
they are involved. 
3. DATA   
(a) Description of datasets 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) has been conducted by Statistics South Africa every six 
months since February 2000. Four waves, September 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, allow for the 
estimation of the impact of receiving a land grant on the household’s probability to satisfy their 
food needs. Despite being advertised as a panel dataset and 80% of the sample of each wave being 
interviewed again in the following wave, a given household cannot be identified between rounds, 
                                                 
7 Southern Africa Labour and Development Unit. 
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which precludes the use of panel data techniques. On the other hand, results obtained when pooling 
the four available waves together suffer from the caveat that many households are sampled twice or 
even three times in these waves (although no household sampled in the 2001 wave could still be 
interviewed in the 2004 wave). Standard errors are artificially inflated in the pooled data estimation 
if the correlation between the error terms for the same household in two different survey rounds is 
ignored. Therefore, I present results obtained with each wave separately. 
As a consequence of the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is not possible to estimate the 
impact of receiving a land grant by comparing beneficiary welfare before and after participation, 
which warrants attention to the usual estimation biases. In addition, since the issue of land 
redistribution is only peripheral in the LFS, one is confronted with several difficulties when trying 
to estimate the impact on welfare of benefiting from the land redistribution policy. Firstly, the 
sampling of observations is based on the population census and income strata and not on the 
number of beneficiaries per geographical unit or/and type of land acquisition scheme, so that the 
sample of beneficiaries in the LFS is not necessarily representative of the land grant beneficiary 
population. For instance, beneficiaries of potentially more successful compartments of land 
transfers, such as shared-equity schemes, could be under-sampled. However, there is no reason why 
it should be regarded as non-randomly biased towards a certain type of beneficiaries. Moreover, 
there is no land-reform specific module, so that we do not have information regarding land use and 
characteristics, access to complementary factors and extension services, participation-related costs 
and benefits, or the date at which the land grant has been received. Therefore, we cannot distinguish 
between heterogeneous beneficiaries, e.g., according to whether or not they are using the land 
transferred. As a consequence, the data do not allow a close investigation of the different channels 
through which participation in land reform impacts on household welfare, nor do they allow 
scrutiny of the potentially heterogeneous impact of the reform on different types of beneficiaries, so 
I focus instead on the global effect on food security status. 
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Despite these limitations, and given the scarcity of data on the impact of land redistribution, 
the LFS has enviable features: (i) it provides a control group of non-beneficiary households, which 
represents a significant advance on the previous literature; (ii) it is a large dataset, therefore 
providing substantial degrees of freedom and a large pool of observations for matching purposes; 
(iii) it covers a comprehensive range of questions, thus offering a wealth of controls; (iv) there are 
four LFS rounds that can be used to estimate the effect of receiving a land grant on household food 
security, which allows checking the robustness of the results obtained. 
The General Household Survey has been conducted every July since 2002, and focuses on 
living standards and access to public services and infrastructure. The data limitations of the LFS 
also apply here. In addition, there are only two survey rounds in which respondents were asked 
about whether they had received a land grant (2002 and 2003), and detailed ethnicity, which we will 
see is an important determinant of both participation in land reform and food insecurity, cannot be 
derived from this survey. However, a new sample, distinct from that of the LFS, is drawn for each 
round, and the questions relating to food insecurity are more explicit than the LFS’s (see next 
section). Therefore, the GHS 2002 and 2003 are used to check the robustness of results obtained 
with the LFS to a change of sample and food insecurity variable. 
(b) Variables 
(i) Dependent variables 
The importance of evaluating the impact of land redistribution on food insecurity was 
motivated in the introduction. It appears all the more important to consider this impact here as in all 
LFS waves, there is a much higher proportion of households reporting difficulties in satisfying their 
food needs among those who report having received a land grant (see Table 1). 
Table 1 goes about here. 
It may be worth noting why I do not also estimate the impact of receiving a land grant on 
usual welfare indicators such as income or expenditure. The main reason for not doing so has to do 
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with data limitations. In the LFS, we only have information about income from the individuals’ 
main activity, which is likely to exclude most income generated by land transfers and is therefore 
not relevant for the purpose of this study. Furthermore, there is one question about household 
expenditure but this (i) does not include explicitly own produce and payments in kind, and (ii) 
provides very limited information about the respondents’ expenditure level since they are only 
asked to report a R400-wide expenditure interval for the month preceding the survey. This interval 
is very wide compared to the poverty line, which lies between R322 and R593 per capita per month 
in 2000 prices according to Hoogeveen et al. (2006). For most beneficiaries, the activities carried 
out on newly acquired land are only one aspect of their livelihood strategies, and one essential 
benefit to be expected for participants is the consumption of their own produce and natural 
resources collection such as firewood and plants. In other words, it would be difficult to judge 
whether a decrease in expenditure, which could be due to the household producing themselves a 
larger share of the goods consumed, would be a good outcome or a bad outcome.  
The food insecurity measure used in the analysis of LFS data is derived from the self-
reported inability of the household to satisfy the food needs of its members in the 12 months 
preceding the survey. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value one when the 
household reports difficulties in satisfying their food needs at least “sometimes”, and zero otherwise 
( FI ). A positive coefficient on a regressor therefore means that it increases food insecurity. 
Qualitatively similar findings are obtained when the dependent variable is an ordinal variable equal 
to 1 for households reporting “never” having experienced difficulties in satisfying their food needs 
in the past 12 months, 2 if “seldom”, 3 if “sometimes”, 4 if “often”, and 5 if “always”. Although 
less information-rich, the binary variable was preferred because the marginal effect of participation 
is more conveniently interpreted, as well as due to methods for the estimation of a bivariate model 
being more readily available for a binary variable rather than an ordered variable. The questions 
related to food insecurity are different in the GHS compared to the LFS. In the former, the questions 
about food insecurity are: “in the past 12 months, did any adult in this household go hungry because 
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there wasn’t enough food?” and “in the past 12 months, did any child (17 or younger) in this 
household go hungry because there wasn’t enough food?”, with answers ranging from “never” to 
“always”. The dependent variable used in the GHS regressions is a binary variable equal to one if 
either children or adults are reported to have gone hungry at least “sometimes”. 
The reliability of this type of self-reported food insecurity measure is well documented both 
in developed and developing countries. It has been shown that answers to food insecurity questions 
are rather well correlated with measures of adults’ actual nutritional outcomes8 such as a healthy 
eating index, Body Mass Index, and low energy and nutrient intake when controlling for household 
socioeconomic characteristics. Melgar-Quinonez et al. (2006) also find strong evidence of the 
correlation between self-reported food insecurity measures and (i) highly nutritive food expenditure 
in all their study areas, and (ii) total food expenditure in all study areas except rural Burkina-Faso. 
In addition, authors who have compared self-reported food insecurity with the food insecurity status 
of households based on in-depth interviews find a strong correspondence between the two 
classifications (e.g., Wolfe et al., 1998, Frongillo, 1999, and Frongillo et al., 2006). Most of these 
studies use a composite measure of self-reported food insecurity based on answers to several food 
insecurity questions (Bhattacharya et al., 2004, is an exception), but there is evidence of a strong 
correlation between answers to different food insecurity questions.9 
However, given the self-reported nature of the dependent variables, there may be a degree of 
misreporting. For instance, some respondents might be tempted to over-report food insecurity in the 
hope of obtaining government assistance. But potential misreporting only constitutes a problem for 
                                                 
8 When children are studied separately, their nutritional outcomes do not seem to be well correlated with subjective food 
insecurity measures (Rose 1999, Bhattacharya et al. 2004). Results in Frongillo et al. (2006) suggests that part of the 
explanation may be that one important determinant of children’s nutritional outcomes are determined by illness.  
9  For instance, Bhattacharya et al. (2004) find a minimum agreement ratio of 90.4% between a composite food 
insecurity scale based on the 1999 Current Population Survey (of the United State Department of Agriculture) and 
answers to individual food insecurity questions, including one question very similar to the one asked in the LFS (“Do 
you have enough food to eat, sometimes not enough to eat, or often not enough to eat?”). 
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the present analysis if the direction or extent of misreporting is correlated with participation, or, in 
other words, if there is an unobserved tendency to over- or under-report food insecurity 
systematically associated with participation. If this is the case, then it can be thought of as one 
particular instance of unobserved variable bias which, as we shall see, is dealt with using recursive 
bivariate probit. 
(ii) Regressors  
Our main regressor of interest is a binary variable equal to one if the household answers 
“yes” to the question “Did the household receive a land grant to obtain a plot of land for residence 
or for farming?” and zero otherwise ( LG ). While the term “grant” is usually used with reference to 
the redistribution component of the land reform program, land restitution beneficiaries have also 
generally received a small “Restitution Discretionary Grant” of R3,000 along with the original land 
restored or compensatory land (Hall, 2004). 
The other regressors have been selected following the empirical literature on nutritional 
status and food insecurity. The regressors used in the literature (e.g., in Rose, 1999; Bhattacharya et 
al., 2004; Smith et al., 2005) to explain food insecurity can generally be grouped under three 
categories: socio-economic status, household composition, and cultural attitudes. All these variables 
can be expected to have an impact on both participation and food insecurity, and should therefore 
be included in the regressions in order to isolate the effect of participation. 
However, the inclusion of socio-economic characteristics that can be caused by participation 
(e.g., current expenditure) should be avoided for two reasons. First, this inclusion could bias the 
estimates since they may be correlated with the residual term. Second, it would make the 
interpretation of the coefficient on the participation dummy ambiguous. For instance, if we think 
that benefiting from a land grant has increased the beneficiary households’ income, and that this 
increase in income has in turn reduced food insecurity, it could be argued that the coefficient on the 
participation dummy is only picking up the effect of having received a land grant over and above its 
effect on other income-related regressors. I therefore focus on variables that are unlikely to be 
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affected by participation. Namely, socio-economic status is proxied by a set of dummies indicating 
the educational attainment of the household head, the gender of the household head, and whether 
the household receives any welfare grants.10  
Demographic characteristics included in the regressions are: household composition 
dummies (whether couple with/without child, single parent, or else); the number of children aged 
less than 5; the number of children aged less than 15; the number of total household members and 
its square; age and square of the age of the household head. I also include a set of binary variables 
capturing ethnicity (as defined by main language spoken at home) aimed at controlling for cultural 
attitudes, which could be correlated with the tendency to report existing food insecurity (for 
instance due to the potentially different degree of stigmatisation of food insecurity, or differences in 
the exact meaning given to the wording of the question in different languages) as well as with the 
tendency of households to experience such problems (due, e.g., to diversity in informal insurance 
mechanisms). Finally, I include province fixed effects in order to control for province-specific 
factors, either relevant to food insecurity (e.g., food prices) or to participation in land reform 
(quality of land, infrastructure, and post-settlement support). This is particularly important insofar 
as land reform implementation is largely decentralised at the provincial level.  
4. ECONOMETRIC APPROACH  
As mentioned earlier, the main difficulty with estimating the impact of receiving a land 
grant on household food insecurity with the present cross-sectional data has to do with the difficulty 
of comparing like with like when the counterfactuals are not the same households before 
participation, but non-participants observed at the same point in time. Three types of biases can 
arise: (i) a bias due to a difference in supports, i.e., to differences in the set of values of 
characteristics at which participants and controls are observed, (ii) a bias due to a mis-weighting of 
observations due to diverging distributions of characteristics between participants and controls, (iii) 
                                                 
10 Eligibility for welfare grants is not linked to receiving a land grant or not. 
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a bias due to differences in unobserved characteristics or “selection bias” (Heckman et al., 1998). 
For brevity, I refer to biases (i) and (ii) as the ‘observed variable bias’ and to bias (iii) as the 
‘unobserved variable bias’. I first focus on my strategy to deal with the observed variable bias 
(propensity score matching), before turning to my approach to tackle unobserved variable bias 
(recursive bivariate probit). 
(a) Dealing with observed variable bias: Propensity score matching 
Section 5(a) presents propensity score matching estimates of the average treatment effect on 
the treated of having received a land grant on household food insecurity. The main principle behind 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimation is to evaluate the impact of a binary treatment (having 
received a land grant LG ) on an outcome variable (food insecurity status FI ) by comparing the 
observed value for this outcome variable between households who have benefited from the 
treatment and households who have not, but who are found to be sufficiently similar, according to a 
set of observed variables X , to act as controls. By construction, this procedure does away with bias 
(ii) and, when the sample is restricted to the region of common support as it is the case here,11 also 
removes bias (i) (Heckman et al., 1998). 
Define the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) as: 
 1 0[ | , 1] [ | , 1]ATT E FI X LG E FI X LG= = − = , 
where the subscript on FI  indicates treated ( )1FI  and untreated ( )0FI  outcomes. 
Also define the propensity score ( ) [ ]Prob 1|p X LG X= = . Rosenbaum et al. (1983) show 
that, if outcomes without the intervention are independent of exposure to treatment within cells 
                                                 
11The matching algorithm used applies nearest neighbour matching, whereby only the control with closest propensity 
score is used for comparison. In the present application, this secures common support insofar as the matches are made 
between treated and control observations with very close propensity scores. To further strengthen common support, the 
2.5% participants at which the propensity score density of the controls is lowest were trimmed off. Results including all 
observations (available upon request) are very close in terms of magnitude, and as much as or more statistically 
significant.    
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defined by X , then these outcomes are also independent of exposure to treatment within cells 
defined by values of ( )p X , i.e., ( )0 |FI LG p X⊥ . The latter condition is often referred to as the 
unconfoundness assumption, and implies that there is no unobserved variable bias after 
conditioning on ( )p X . 
The propensity score ( )p X  can be computed using a binary model (here, probit), so as to 
evaluate the probability of household j  to receive a land grant conditional on the set of pre-
treatment covariates X . In this paper, participants are then matched with the non-participant 
household with closest propensity score (nearest-neighbour matching), and the ATT is non-
parametrically estimated as ( )1 0
1
1 B
j ij
j
ATT FI FI
B =
= −∑ , where 0ijFI  refers to non-beneficiary 
household i  matched with beneficiary household j , and B  is the total number of beneficiaries. 
Heckman et al. (1998) find that observed variable bias, which is removed by matching, is by 
far the largest source of bias in their data. However, the respective sign and size of each bias is 
bound to vary between datasets, so that it is important to check whether the PSM estimates could be 
led by unobserved variable bias. In the following section, I describe how I investigate the effect of 
neglecting the issue of selection on unobserved characteristics. 
(b) Dealing with unobserved variable bias: Recursive bivariate probit 
Section 5(b) first presents probit estimates of the following equation:  
 * *,          1 if 0, 0 otherwise FI X LG FI FIβ α ε′= + + = >  ( )1  
where ε  is a residual term and X  is the full set of controls introduced in Section 3. I then 
turn to investigate the sensitivity of these results to potential unobserved variable bias using a 
recursive bivariate probit model in which participation and food insecurity are determined 
simultaneously. The following system is estimated simultaneously: 
 
* *
1 1
* *
2 2
,    1 if >0, 0 otherwise 
,              1 if >0, 0 otherwise
FI X LG FI FI
LG X LG LG
β γ ε
β ε
′⎧ = + + =⎪⎨ ′= + =⎪⎩
 ( )2                                     
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allowing for the residuals of the two equations to be correlated. More specifically, this bivariate 
probit model can be written: 
 [ ] ( )2 1 2Prob 1, 1| , ,FI LG X X LG Xβ γ β ρ′ ′= = = Φ +   
where:              
( )
2
1 2
 is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function 
X is the full set of controls described in Section 3.
cov ,ρ ε ε
Φ
=
 
The potential existence of a correlation between the error terms 1ε  and 2ε , i.e., the presence 
of some unobserved variable bias, is thus testable (by testing whether 0ρ = ), and accounted for in 
the estimation procedure. If 0ρ ≠ , the bivariate estimates should be preferred to single equation 
estimates, whereas the model is correctly estimated by two separate probit models when 0ρ = . If 
1ε  is positively correlated with 2ε , e.g., due to income or food insecurity before participation 
increasing both the likelihood of participation and that of being food insecure, then 0ρ >  and the 
coefficient on the participation variable is overestimated. However, if the correlation goes in 
opposite directions, 0ρ <  and the participation coefficient is underestimated. For instance, this 
could be the case because better informed, better connected, more able or simply more opportunistic 
individuals may be both more likely to apply for a land grant and less likely to experience lack of 
food. 
Wilde (2000) demonstrates that as long as one regressor 1X  in X  offers enough variation, 
which is guaranteed in most economic applications including the present one,12 the full rank of the 
matrix of regressors is a sufficient condition for the model’s identification, so that, in theory, 
identification does not require that one or more regressors entering the participation equation is 
excluded from the food insecurity equation. It would certainly be preferable to include such an 
instrument in the model, especially since in the absence of such variable the reliability of the 
                                                 
12 In the recursive bivariate probit models presented in this paper, there are 68 unknown parameters to be estimated, so 
that, as showed in Wilde (2000), theoretical identification requires that at least 68 independent probabilities enter the 
likelihood function. This condition is easily satisfied in the data used here. Further details are available upon request. 
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exogeneity test (i.e., the test that 0ρ = ) depends on the assumption that the residuals are bivariate 
normal distributed (Monfardini et al., 2007). No suitable instrument could be found in the present 
dataset. Results should therefore be taken with caution. Despite this caveat, it is interesting to use 
recursive bivariate probit estimates as an indicator of the likely direction of the unobserved variable 
bias, i.e., of the sign of the correlation between 1ε  and 2ε .  
5. RESULTS 
(a) Propensity Score Matching Estimates 
In Table 2 below, propensity score matching estimates are presented for each of the four 
LFS waves and two alternative sets of regressors entering the propensity score. The average 
difference in propensity scores between treated households and their matched control is virtually 
zero (see Table 2), indicating that nearest-neighbour matching does not produce matches between 
distant neighbours. Furthermore, nearly all beneficiaries can be matched to a suitable control thanks 
to the large pool of potential controls, with most of the difference between matched beneficiaries 
and their total number being due to the trimming of 2.5% of participants to further ensure common 
support.11 
In addition to the unconfoundness assumption, the reliability of the ATT estimates obtained 
by propensity score matching relies on the condition that the distribution of the variables included 
in X  should be the same for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries with the same propensity score, i.e. 
( )|LG X p X⊥  (so that matching on ( )p X  leads to comparing observations with similar values of 
X , on average). The balancing property is here considered satisfied if a t-test does not reject 
equality of means in each covariate included in the propensity score between treated and matched 
households. 
Table 2 goes about here. 
Comparing treated and non-treated households with similar distributions for education, 
gender, age of the household head, household size, single parenthood and benefits receiving, I find 
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that beneficiaries are still significantly more likely to report difficulties in satisfying their food 
needs than non-participants by between 8.4 and 10.2%-points, and this difference is significant at 
the 1% significance level. However, when the propensity scores are estimated using the full set of 
regressors, the difference in food insecurity prevalence between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
increases for the 2003 wave, but decreases for the three other waves, even becoming insignificant 
for LFS 2002. Results obtained for 2001 and 2004 are very similar. This is of interest because the 
LFS survey design implies that no household is sampled in both the 2001 and the 2004 waves, 
suggesting that the results obtained are not specific to one cohort of beneficiaries. 
These results confirm the negative picture conveyed by the literature. It is important to 
remark that, given the nature of the counterfactuals, namely, households with similar characteristics 
observed at the same point in time, these findings do not necessarily imply that participants have 
not, on average, personally enjoyed more food security as a consequence of their participation, but 
that their endowments would have been better rewarded in terms of food security if they had not 
taken part in land reform. 
What more can we learn from these PSM estimates? First, it is interesting to note that the 
ATT estimates obtained do not differ much from those derived from single probit estimates except 
for 2002, suggesting only limited observed variable bias. Indeed, the probit ATT estimate using the 
full set of regressors is 6.9, 4.6, 10.8, and 5.0%-points for 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004, respectively, 
compared to the corresponding PSM estimates of 5.8, 2.1, 12.9, and 5%-points.13 Second, the 
propensity score equations indicate that the usual socio-economic variables affect participation only 
weakly. As can be seen in Columns (3), (6), (9) and (12) of Table 3, only ethnicity and province 
systematically affect the probability of receiving a land grant. Socio-economic and demographic 
variables, on the other hand, are not robust predictors of participation, since none of these variables 
                                                 
13  The average treatment effect on the treated using probit estimates is obtained as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∑
=
′Φ−+′Φ=
B
j
jjj XLGXBATT
1
ˆˆˆ1 βαβ . 
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have a significant impact on participation in more than two out of four waves. 14  The poor 
individual predictive power of socioeconomic variables in the participation equation should not 
surprise given the “one-size fits all” approach to land redistribution adopted in the country and the 
mixed evidence regarding the programme’s pro-poor targeting. On the contrary, the significant role 
of ethnic affiliation and province of residence suggests that there might be unobservables correlated 
with participation. Such unobservable characteristics may also affect food insecurity in an a priori 
undetermined direction, thus creating a bias. In the following section, I shed light on the likely 
direction of this potential unobserved variable bias. 
(b) Recursive bivariate probit estimates 
Ideally, one would like to carry out bivariate probit regressions on the sample of matched 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, in which the observed variable bias is minimised. This is, 
however, more than the data can support, insofar as the recursive bivariate probit model including 
the full set of regressors does not converge for two out of four rounds when the sample is restricted 
to matched households. For the two rounds for which the model converges, the estimate of ρ  and 
its standard error are, respectively, -0.91 (0.230) for 2001 and 0.21 (0.636) for 2004, although for 
both rounds, we cannot reject that 0ρ =  on the basis of the likelihood ratio test (p-values are, 
respectively, 0.41 and 0.75). In addition to the convergence problem encountered with the 2002 and 
2003 rounds, there are three reasons why I focus here on recursive bivariate probit models estimated 
using the whole sample: (i) as witnessed by the very large standard error estimate of ρ  for 2004 
using the matched sample only, the estimates based on the small matched samples (the largest of 
these being 1512, i.e. 756 beneficiaries matched to 756 controls) are very imprecisely estimated; (ii) 
except for 2002, the estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated obtained with 
propensity score matching are reasonably close to those obtained with probit models using the full 
                                                 
14 For brevity’s sake, the estimates of the probit models used to calculate the propensity scores are not reported here, as 
they are qualitatively similar to the participation equations of the bivariate models shown in Table 3. 
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samples; and (iii) given the reliance of the likelihood ratio test of 0ρ =  on the normality of the 
joint distribution of 1ε  and 2ε , it would seem preferable to use larger samples. 
Table 3 shows the results obtained with each LFS wave, using the full (Black) sample. 
Unsurprisingly, results indicate that households with lower-educated heads, receiving welfare 
grants, whose head is a single-parent, and larger households are more food insecure. Although one 
could expect these households to be poorer, female-headed households and households whose head 
is elderly are not found to be systematically more food insecure. This could be due to the way 
money is spent in these households: for instance, women are known to favour food expenditure over 
tobacco (e.g. Hoddinott et al., 1997). In the case of elderly household heads, the effect may have to 
do with old age pensioners receiving comparatively high pensions (R940 as of April 2008). I also 
find that food insecurity significantly decreases with the number of children under 5 years old in 
2003 and 2004, but systematically increases with the number of children age 15 or under. This may 
be due to the fact that the ubiquitous child support grant (R210 as of April 2008) does not vary with 
child age, whilst the cost of child care tends to increase. Households of different ethnic origins, as 
captured here by the language spoken at home, also have significantly different probabilities of 
reporting food insecurity. Finally, the province of residence affects the propensity to report 
difficulties satisfying food needs, with households in the Eastern Cape (the omitted category) 
appearing the most often food insecure and households in Gauteng the least. 
Table 3 goes about here. 
Although the LR exogeneity test only leads to the rejection of the hypothesis that 0ρ =  for 
the 2001 round, the estimate of ρ  is negative in all rounds, suggesting that unobserved variable 
bias would tend to bias the naïve estimate of the land grant coefficient downwards. In other words, 
the result that land grantees are more food insecure than non-grantees with similar observed 
characteristics does not appear to be due to unobserved variable bias. Indeed, the land grant 
coefficient increases in the bivariate probit specification compared to the univariate probit, although 
it is insignificant in the 2003 and 2004 rounds due to higher imprecision. 
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(c) Further results 
The General Household Survey provides the opportunity for testing the robustness of the 
results obtained with the LFS, since samples, month of interview, and the food insecurity questions 
asked respondents differ. Contrary to the LFS, a new sample is drawn for each round of the GHS, 
so that the two relevant waves (2002 and 2003) can be stacked together.15 As with the LFS, land 
grant beneficiaries in the GHS report experiencing hunger more often than non-beneficiaries (see 
Table 4). 
Table 4 goes about here. 
Based on probit results, beneficiary households are, on average, 4.01%-points more likely to 
report either children or adults in the household having gone hungry at least sometimes in the 12 
months preceding the survey, controlling for all the socioeconomic and geographical factors listed 
in Section 3, except for the set of household language dummies, that cannot be created from the 
GHS data.13 The corresponding average treatment effect on the treated based on propensity score 
matching using the same controls is 4.13%-points, suggesting little observed variable bias. Both the 
probit coefficient on the land grant indicator and the ATT estimated with PSM are statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level. Recursive bivariate probit estimates suggest that the probit 
estimate is not overestimating the adverse effect of participation on the household propensity to 
report hunger episodes, since the estimate of ρ , the coefficient of correlation, is negative (and 
statistically insignificant). 
Table 5 goes about here. 
6. DISCUSSION 
Confirming the insights provided by non-quantitative studies, data from the South African 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) and General Household Survey (GHS) suggest that, on average, land 
                                                 
15 When the analysis is carried out separately on GHS 2002 and GHS 2003, the sign of the participation coefficient and 
of ρ  are the same for both datasets, but the participation effect is not significant in GHS 2002.  
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reform beneficiaries do not appear to have experienced lower food insecurity as a consequence of 
land redistribution. On the contrary, land grant recipients tend to have more difficulties in satisfying 
their food needs than non-beneficiaries with a similar profile. It is important to reiterate that, given 
the nature of the counterfactuals, namely, households with similar characteristics observed at the 
same point in time, these findings do not necessarily imply that participants have not, on average, 
personally enjoyed more food security as a consequence of their participation, but that their 
endowments would have been better rewarded in terms of food security should they not have taken 
part in land reform. 
The seemingly adverse effect of participation warrants discussion. Higher food insecurity as 
defined here is mainly the result of (i) a lower average or ‘typical’ level of resources that can be 
transformed into food (increased ‘poverty’) and/or (ii) of an increased probability of falling below a 
critical threshold in the availability of these resources (increased ‘vulnerability’). The term 
‘poverty’ is only opposed to ‘vulnerability’ for the clarity of the argument. It certainly is not meant 
to imply that vulnerability is not a component of a broader definition of poverty.  
Surely, households take part in land redistribution because they expect to gain from 
participation. However, households may end up with an unexpectedly low level of resources after 
land redistribution because they have miscalculated the costs and benefits of participation. In 
particular, they may have misjudged the extent of relocation costs, land and non-land production 
factors needs or availability, project disorganisation, or the previously suggested unequal land 
appropriation by a project élite. The costs contemplated here are manifold. There are displacement 
costs of course: 43.4% of households surveyed for the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) in 2001 
(Ahmed et al., 2003, p.43) had to move to live on redistributed land. These displacement costs are 
material costs, including costs of transportation of family members and goods, potential loss of 
income-generating activities for some of the households’ members, and transaction costs such as 
search costs to find all the needed services and goods in a new living area. These costs are likely to 
be particularly important in South Africa due to the historical confinement of the Black into areas 
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well apart from the white-owned land that is now being redistributed (Zimmerman, 2000). 
Transport costs to travel to redistributed land when beneficiaries have not relocated are also often 
cited as a major barrier for land reform beneficiaries to take advantage of their newly acquired land 
(e.g., in Bradstock, 2005) especially for rural women (Wegerif, 2004). The costs of starting a new 
economic activity may be very high for these beneficiaries since the land grants do not usually 
cover much more than the cost of the sole land. Some farmers in Wegerif (2004) even report “that 
they are currently subsidising the farms with their own money from other sources” (p.38). In 
addition, beneficiary households and implementers of the programme report various forms of costly 
disorganisation at the project level (McCusker, 2002; Ahmed et al., 2003; Wegerif, 2004), including 
a high prevalence of unpaid work (see Ahmed et al., 2003, p. 118). 
Even in the context of a very successful participation in land reform, one would expect costs 
to dominate benefits at the onset. It could be the case that the beneficiaries in the present sample 
have simply not started reaping the benefits of participation yet. In the absence of information about 
the date of the land transfer, it is not possible to test this hypothesis. However, it is unclear whether 
the food insecurity differential between land grantees and non-land grantees has decreased over the 
period covered by the data: in 2001, the PSM average treatment effect on the treated was 0.058 (i.e., 
5.8 %-points), and it was 0.050 in 2004. Between these two dates, it has decreased (from 2001 and 
2002) before reaching its maximum in 2003. Having received land earlier in time does not 
necessarily follows from being observed to be a land grantee at an earlier date, but if the time factor 
was overwhelming, one would expect to find at least some indication of a decreasing trend in the 
beneficiary/non-beneficiary food insecurity differential. 
Looking at factors that may have specifically increased the variability of households’ 
resources, it is useful to consider separately ex ante and ex post insurance mechanisms. Ex ante risk 
coping strategies include essentially the choice of low risk activities and diversification of activities. 
Ex post risk coping strategies are, for example, the use of savings and participation in informal 
insurance mechanisms. It might be argued that agriculture being a risky activity – and especially so 
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in mostly semi-arid South Africa – beneficiaries become more vulnerable as they choose to employ 
their time and effort in agriculture rather than in less risky activities. Furthermore, broken social 
links and solidarity networks due to resettlement,16 along with the scooping out of their savings to 
incur resettlement costs, may be making beneficiary households more vulnerable to shocks 
affecting them.   
 In the context of the South African land reform, whereby much of the land has been 
transferred to often large groups of beneficiaries without subsequent subdivision between 
beneficiaries, it is important to remark that credit constraints at the household level may not be 
reduced by land transfers when the household does not have individual property rights to a specific 
plot of land. 
In addition, if complementary production factors are not readily available, then land 
redistribution beneficiaries may not be able to use land productively. Indeed, lack of appropriate 
human capital and poor access to ancillary markets have been shown to prevent an efficient use of 
land in the former homelands (see Carter et al., 1999; Aliber, 2003) and are likely to affect 
productivity on newly acquired land in “white” areas as well. Data limitations prevent much 
analysis of the role played by access to complementary factors, but it is possible to use the limited 
information on household expenditure provided in the LFS/GHS to shed some light on the role of 
credit constraints. If credit constraints were driving the poor welfare outcomes of land grants found 
in the present analysis, then we would expect wealthier households to have better participation 
outcomes. In order to shed some light on this point, I used the expenditure intervals provided in the 
surveys, dividing their mid-points by the number of adult-equivalent household members to obtain a 
proxy for wealth, and included this proxy and its interaction with the participation indicator in the 
probit equations reported in Tables 3. The same was done for the two GHS datasets (separately for 
GHS 2002 and GHS 2003 to ensure comparability of expenditure levels across observations). There 
is limited evidence of wealth-dependent participation outcomes in the data used here, as the 
                                                 
16 See Cross et al., 1996, for South Africa and Dekker, 2004, for a study of Zimbabwean land reform. 
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participation effect appears to vary with expenditure level in two out of six datasets. The estimated 
treatment effects on the treated are plotted against the wealth proxy in Figure 1 for the individual 
datasets in which the land grant-expenditure interaction term is significant, namely LFS 2002 and 
GHS 2003.17 
Figure 1 goes about here. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The present study confirms econometrically the doubts previously expressed by most 
commentators on the impact of land redistribution in South Africa. Comparing beneficiary and non-
beneficiary households with similar distributions for a rich set of covariates, propensity score 
matching estimates indicate that households who say they have received a land grant are more 
likely to report difficulties in satisfying their food needs than non-land grantees by between 2.1- to 
12.9%-points, depending on which of the four relevant LFS waves is considered, with only the 
lowest estimate insignificant at the 10% significance level. In addition, propensity score matching 
estimates show that beneficiary households surveyed in the General Household Survey 2002 and 
2003 are, on average, 4.13%-points more likely to report either children or adults in the household 
having gone hungry at least sometimes in the 12 months preceding the survey compared to 
households with similar socio-economic and demographic characteristics. The main limitation of 
these estimates is that they may be biased if there are confounding factors correlated both with 
participation in the programme and food insecurity. Recursive bivariate probit models allows for the 
testing of the presence and direction of such bias. In all datasets but one (LFS 2001), these suggest 
that there is no statistically significant omitted variable bias, since we cannot reject the null that the 
coefficient of correlation between the residuals of the participation equation and the food insecurity 
                                                 
17 Regression results are available upon request. 
18 The provision of extension services has been found to improve the value of resettled farmers’ crop production 
elsewhere, notably in nearby Zimbabwe (see Owens et al., 2003). 
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equation ( ρ ) is equal to zero. The reliance of the test of 0ρ =  on the assumption that the residuals 
are bivariate normal casts some doubt on its reliability. However, in all five datasets used in this 
paper, 0ρ < , which would suggest that unobserved variable bias, if it exists, tends to lead to the 
underestimation of the food insecurity effect of participation in land reform (in other words, the 
adverse effect of participation may be larger than indicated by naïve probit estimates). 
 With the limitations of the data currently at hand, caution should prevail, especially with 
respect to the exact magnitude of the effect of participation in the program. Further research is 
needed to shed light on (i) the impact of participation on other welfare indicators, (ii) whether the 
difficulties of land reform beneficiaries are only transitory, (iii) the causes of the difficulties 
experienced – and in particular, whether poorer participants face specific challenges, (iv) conditions 
for land transfers to truly benefit their recipients. Complementary policies may be needed to make 
land redistribution an efficient tool to reduce poverty (Finan et al., 2005). Potential complementary 
policies to be considered are, among others, an increased provision of agricultural support services,1 
facilitation of access to credit for poorer beneficiaries, infrastructure improvement or simply 
effective transitional food support for poorer participants if their difficulties are found to be of a 
temporary nature. 
Several policy changes introduced recently may change the outlook of land reform in the 
country. In 2004, a Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) was introduced to 
improve the provision of skills and (on- and off-farm) infrastructure support. From October 2006 
onwards, other more radical policy changes have occurred, as a result of discussions originated at 
the July 2005 Land Summit between representatives of the government, farmer unions, and civil 
society. Changes announced by the minister in Department of Land Affairs (2006) are: (i) a move 
away from the “willing-buyer, willing-seller” principle for restitution purposes; (ii) the beginning of 
a “pro-active land acquisition strategy” whereby the “focus is on the State as a lead driver in land 
redistribution rather than the current beneficiary-driven redistribution” (p.3), i.e., where the 
government initiates land purchases and then redistributes it to beneficiaries; (iii) a move towards 
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“area-based planning”, i.e., the integration of land and agrarian reform programmes within broader 
municipal plans; (iv) the launch of a public small-credit scheme (not exclusively aimed at land 
reform beneficiaries), the Micro Agricultural Financial Institute of South Africa (MAFISA); and (v) 
the “alignment between the departments of agriculture and land affairs for effective, efficient land 
and agrarian reform delivery” (p.6). Furthermore, there has been a move towards the extension of 
redistribution targets along the whole agricultural chain rather than simply at the land ownership 
level through the adoption of a specific Black Economic Empowerment (AgriBEE) charter in 
February 2008. Finally, the imminent launch of a new land grant, the Land Acquisition/Share 
Acquisition grant, has been officially announced. However, with these recent initiatives as with the 
whole land reform, lack of data drastically limits the potential for policy evaluation. Given the high 
profile of land reform in the country and the concerns confirmed here regarding its impact on 
participants, a data collection effort appears most urgently needed. 
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Tables and Figure for 
 The Food (In)security Impact of Land Redistribution in South Africa: 
Microeconometric evidence from national data 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Food insecurity amongst beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
 Food secure Food insecure Total 
LFS2001 
Non-beneficiaries 55% 
 
45% 
 
100% 
(23,833) 
Beneficiaries 43% 
 
57% 
 
100% 
(652) 
Total 55% 
 
45% 
 
100% 
(24,485) 
LFS2002 
Non-beneficiaries 61% 
 
39% 
 
100% 
(22,849) 
Beneficiaries 46% 
 
54% 
 
100% 
(543) 
Total 60% 
 
40% 
 
100% 
(23,392) 
LFS2003 
Non-beneficiaries 69% 
 
31% 
 
100% 
(23,328) 
Beneficiaries 56% 
 
44% 
 
100% 
(337) 
Total 69% 31% 100% 
(23,665) 
LFS2004 
Non-beneficiaries 65% 
 
35% 
 
100% 
(24,841) 
Beneficiaries 57% 
 
43% 
 
100% 
(783) 
Total 65% 
 
35% 
 
100% 
(25,624) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the sample of households headed by a black individual in Statistics 
South Africa’s LFS September 2001-2004. Sample size in parentheses. 
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Table 2: Propensity score matching estimates of the effect of receiving a land grant on food insecurity, LFS 
  2001   2002   2003   2004  
 
ATT 
 
 
0.084*** 
[0.027]     
0.058** 
[0.027] 
0.088*** 
[0.030] 
0.021 
[0.031]   
0.102*** 
[0.037]   
0.129*** 
[0.030]     
0.087*** 
[0.027] 
0.050* 
[0.027] 
Balancing 
Propertya Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regressors included in propensity score: 
 
Education 
Female head 
Receiving welfare  
Single parent 
Household size 
Age of head 
√  √  √  √  
 
Full set of 
regressors 
 
 √  √  √  √ 
Number of matched 
beneficiaries 620 620 523 523 325 325 756 756 
Mean difference in 
propensity scores 
between beneficiary 
and matched control 
2.43e-07 .0000173 2.37e-07 .0000305 2.01e-07 .0000722 2.26e-07 .000033 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the sample of households headed by a black individual in Statistics South Africa’s 
LFS September 2001-2004. ATT = Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Matching algorithm is nearest neighbour 
matching without replacement using psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). To further ensure common support, the 2.5% 
participants at which the propensity score density of the controls is lowest were trimmed off. aThe smallest p-value for a t-
test of difference in means in a single variable is 0.028 (2004, full set of regressors), with the second smallest as high as 
0.095. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: Probit and bivariate probit estimates of the effect of receiving a land grant on food insecurity, LFS 
  2001   2002   2003   2004  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Probit Bivariate Probit Probit Bivariate Probit Probit Bivariate Probit Probit Bivariate Probit 
Dependent variable FI FI LG FI FI LG FI FI LG FI FI LG 
             
=1 if land grant 0.192*** 1.000***  0.126** 0.668*  0.303*** 0.367  0.141*** 0.440  
 [0.053] [0.289]  [0.057] [0.342]  [0.075] [0.304]  [0.050] [0.269]  
Socio-economic characteristics 
Education of household head (omitted: no education) 
=1 if primary -0.108*** -0.112*** 0.106** -0.133*** -0.131*** -0.034 -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.003 -0.074*** -0.075*** 0.087* 
 [0.026] [0.026] [0.054] [0.027] [0.027] [0.061] [0.028] [0.028] [0.077] [0.025] [0.025] [0.052] 
=1 if lower secondary -0.296*** -0.297*** 0.067 -0.241*** -0.241*** 0.099 -0.256*** -0.256*** 0.048 -0.237*** -0.238*** 0.063 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.058] [0.028] [0.028] [0.062] [0.029] [0.029] [0.081] [0.027] [0.027] [0.056] 
=1 if senior secondary -0.527*** -0.526*** 0.068 -0.493*** -0.492*** 0.022 -0.575*** -0.575*** 0.029 -0.498*** -0.499*** 0.067 
 [0.030] [0.030] [0.065] [0.031] [0.031] [0.069] [0.032] [0.032] [0.087] [0.030] [0.030] [0.059] 
=1 if higher -1.087*** -1.082*** 0.080 -1.143*** -1.132*** -0.318*** -1.267*** -1.267*** -0.107 -1.114*** -1.115*** 0.062 
 [0.046] [0.046] [0.088] [0.050] [0.051] [0.123] [0.057] [0.057] [0.142] [0.052] [0.052] [0.088] 
=1 if female head 0.099*** 0.091*** 0.172*** 0.035 0.034 0.063 0.051** 0.050** 0.051 0.029 0.029 0.021 
 [0.024] [0.024] [0.054] [0.025] [0.025] [0.061] [0.025] [0.025] [0.078] [0.024] [0.024] [0.048] 
=1 if receives welfare 0.127*** 0.129*** -0.085 0.101*** 0.099*** 0.052 0.127*** 0.127*** -0.067 0.166*** 0.164*** 0.102** 
 [0.025] [0.025] [0.053] [0.025] [0.025] [0.053] [0.024] [0.024] [0.063] [0.022] [0.022] [0.043] 
Demographic composition 
No. children <=5 0.012 0.013 -0.013 0.004 0.004 -0.020 -0.038** -0.038** -0.015 -0.027* -0.028* 0.059** 
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.033] [0.016] [0.016] [0.037] [0.017] [0.017] [0.047] [0.015] [0.015] [0.029] 
No. children <=15 0.039*** 0.041*** -0.055** 0.025** 0.026** -0.044 0.044*** 0.045*** -0.078** 0.057*** 0.057*** -0.014 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.023] [0.012] [0.012] [0.028] [0.013] [0.013] [0.036] [0.011] [0.011] [0.023] 
Household composition (omitted: “other”) 
=1 if couple, no child 0.031 0.022 0.209*** 0.015 0.013 0.085 0.019 0.019 -0.027 -0.055 -0.057 0.118* 
 [0.035] [0.035] [0.075] [0.036] [0.036] [0.085] [0.037] [0.037] [0.101] [0.035] [0.035] [0.068] 
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=1 if couple with kid -0.029 -0.047 0.370*** -0.043 -0.050 0.266*** -0.074** -0.075** 0.079 -0.153*** -0.155*** 0.083 
 [0.036] [0.036] [0.074] [0.034] [0.034] [0.079] [0.035] [0.036] [0.101] [0.029] [0.029] [0.058] 
=1 if single parent 0.143*** 0.133*** 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.158*** 0.191*** 0.124*** 0.124*** -0.038 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.050 
 [0.030] [0.029] [0.061] [0.029] [0.029] [0.065] [0.029] [0.029] [0.088] [0.022] [0.022] [0.044] 
Household members 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.067** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.011 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.113*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.047 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.030] [0.012] [0.012] [0.033] [0.013] [0.013] [0.039] [0.012] [0.012] [0.029] 
Household members2 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004* -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.000 -0.002** -0.002** -0.005 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Age of head -0.000 -0.001 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 0.032*** -0.002 -0.002 0.024** -0.001 -0.001 0.010 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.003] [0.003] [0.008] [0.003] [0.003] [0.010] [0.003] [0.003] [0.006] 
Age of head2 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Language dummies (omitted: “other”) 
Debele 0.180** 0.147* 0.649*** 0.300*** 0.299*** 0.246* 0.622*** 0.623*** 0.288* 0.458*** 0.469*** -0.422*** 
 [0.075] [0.075] [0.139] [0.083] [0.083] [0.146] [0.083] [0.083] [0.149] [0.080] [0.080] [0.132] 
Xhosa 0.492*** 0.469*** 0.443*** 0.663*** 0.647*** 0.453*** 0.727*** 0.725*** 0.457*** 0.601*** 0.589*** 0.497*** 
 [0.038] [0.039] [0.088] [0.040] [0.041] [0.087] [0.042] [0.043] [0.102] [0.038] [0.039] [0.069] 
Zulu 0.415*** 0.391*** 0.570*** 0.538*** 0.516*** 0.599*** 0.726*** 0.723*** 0.721*** 0.525*** 0.527*** -0.231** 
 [0.044] [0.045] [0.107] [0.048] [0.050] [0.105] [0.051] [0.053] [0.111] [0.048] [0.048] [0.091] 
Sotho 0.407*** 0.389*** 0.398*** 0.567*** 0.559*** 0.280** 0.559*** 0.559*** 0.004 0.538*** 0.533*** 0.206** 
 [0.046] [0.047] [0.112] [0.049] [0.050] [0.114] [0.053] [0.053] [0.164] [0.048] [0.048] [0.103] 
Sepedi 0.361*** 0.333*** 0.602*** 0.434*** 0.435*** -0.042 0.469*** 0.469*** -0.080 0.541*** 0.552*** -0.594*** 
 [0.045] [0.046] [0.107] [0.049] [0.049] [0.121] [0.054] [0.054] [0.135] [0.051] [0.052] [0.110] 
Tswana 0.327*** 0.319*** 0.246** 0.426*** 0.417*** 0.341*** 0.494*** 0.494*** 0.308** 0.488*** 0.485*** 0.141 
 [0.045] [0.044] [0.096] [0.048] [0.048] [0.105] [0.051] [0.051] [0.120] [0.048] [0.048] [0.088] 
Siswati 0.426*** 0.421*** 0.202 0.661*** 0.685*** -0.287** 0.441*** 0.446*** -0.548*** 0.451*** 0.480*** -0.807*** 
 [0.064] [0.063] [0.148] [0.066] [0.067] [0.144] [0.073] [0.076] [0.175] [0.073] [0.077] [0.125] 
Tsonga 0.306*** 0.263*** 0.836*** 0.360*** 0.355*** 0.351*** 0.382*** 0.382*** -0.126 0.356*** 0.363*** -0.265** 
 [0.052] [0.054] [0.111] [0.056] [0.056] [0.128] [0.061] [0.061] [0.193] [0.063] [0.063] [0.123] 
English -0.273*** -0.281*** -0.035 -0.349*** -0.355*** -0.171 -0.174** -0.174** -5.128*** -0.251*** -0.247*** -0.306** 
 [0.057] [0.057] [0.160] [0.066] [0.067] [0.199] [0.073] [0.073] [0.120] [0.076] [0.076] [0.131] 
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Province dummies (omitted: Eastern Cape) 
Western Cape  -0.454*** -0.439*** -0.214** -0.510*** -0.490*** -0.417*** -0.414*** -0.415*** 0.786*** -0.343*** -0.354*** 0.524*** 
 [0.043] [0.044] [0.094] [0.044] [0.046] [0.090] [0.046] [0.047] [0.136] [0.043] [0.044] [0.085] 
Northern Cape  -0.200*** -0.218*** 0.405*** -0.373*** -0.366*** -0.024 -0.152*** -0.154*** 1.040*** 0.069 0.049 0.864*** 
 [0.053] [0.053] [0.091] [0.054] [0.055] [0.102] [0.056] [0.057] [0.149] [0.048] [0.051] [0.089] 
Free State  -0.324*** -0.296*** -0.782*** -0.413*** -0.388*** -0.799*** -0.408*** -0.408*** 0.183 -0.209*** -0.210*** -0.390** 
 [0.049] [0.049] [0.128] [0.050] [0.053] [0.119] [0.051] [0.051] [0.204] [0.048] [0.048] [0.158] 
Kwazulu-Natal  -0.563*** -0.527*** -1.221*** -0.508*** -0.469*** -1.520*** -0.480*** -0.478*** -0.279 -0.108** -0.122** 0.762*** 
 [0.048] [0.049] [0.140] [0.050] [0.056] [0.169] [0.050] [0.051] [0.174] [0.047] [0.049] [0.101] 
North West  -0.299*** -0.324*** 0.352*** -0.419*** -0.397*** -0.607*** -0.189*** -0.189*** 0.274* 0.049 0.042 0.186* 
 [0.049] [0.049] [0.081] [0.050] [0.053] [0.111] [0.051] [0.051] [0.162] [0.052] [0.052] [0.110] 
Gauteng  -0.577*** -0.557*** -0.317*** -0.650*** -0.625*** -0.718*** -0.668*** -0.669*** 0.612*** -0.476*** -0.488*** 0.531*** 
 [0.042] [0.043] [0.086] [0.045] [0.048] [0.106] [0.047] [0.047] [0.145] [0.045] [0.046] [0.093] 
Mpumalanga  -0.338*** -0.337*** -0.017 -0.436*** -0.458*** 0.306*** -0.414*** -0.421*** 1.523*** -0.016 -0.069 1.760*** 
 [0.052] [0.052] [0.099] [0.053] [0.054] [0.095] [0.055] [0.064] [0.146] [0.054] [0.070] [0.098] 
Limpopo  -0.194*** -0.177*** -0.336*** -0.385*** -0.369*** -0.496*** -0.411*** -0.413*** 0.535*** -0.366*** -0.384*** 0.738*** 
 [0.049] [0.049] [0.099] [0.052] [0.053] [0.112] [0.055] [0.055] [0.173] [0.053] [0.055] [0.108] 
Constant -0.051 -0.040 -2.830*** -0.185** -0.185** -2.860*** -0.433*** -0.431*** -4.052*** -0.532*** -0.519*** -3.070*** 
 [0.090] [0.090] [0.198] [0.092] [0.092] [0.224] [0.093] [0.094] [0.301] [0.089] [0.089] [0.185] 
Observations 24074 24074 24074 23066 23066 23066 23438 23438 23438 25341 25341 25341 
Pseudo R2 0.0974   0.1045   0.1098   0.0939   
ρ a  -0.367** 
[.130] 
  
-0.249 
[.154] 
  
-0.0295 
[.132] 
  
-0.137 
[.119] 
 
p-value of likelihood 
ratio test of 0=ρ   0.0195   0.1262   0.8275   0.2771  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the sample of households headed by a black individual in Statistics South Africa’s LFS September 2001-2004. FI= food insecurity indicator (=1 if problems satisfying 
food needs “sometimes”, “often” or “always”), LG=participation indicator (=1 if received a land grant). Robust Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. asignificance level based on 
likelihood-ratio test.
 40 
 
Table 4: Prevalence of hunger in GHS 2002/2003 
 “Never” or “seldom” 
hungry 
Hungry at least 
“sometimes” 
Total 
 
Child food insecurity (17 or younger) 
Non-beneficiaries 74% 26% 100% 
(30,456)a 
Beneficiaries 68% 32% 100% 
(668)a 
Adult food insecurity 
Non-beneficiaries 74% 26% 100% 
(45,472)a 
Beneficiaries 65% 35% 100% 
(883)a 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the sample of households headed by a black individual in Statistics 
South Africa’s GHS 2002 and 2003. Sample size in parentheses. a Sample size varies as some households 
have no children 17 or younger or no member over 17 years of age. 
 
 
Table 5: Estimation results for GHS 2002/2003 
 Propensity score matchinga: Probit Bivariate probit 
Dependent variable  Hunger Hunger 
    
ATT .0413** [0.0438]   
No. of  matched beneficiaries 847   
    
Coefficient on LG  0.115** 0.429* 
  [0.046] [0.255] 
Observations  45712 45712 
Pseudo R-squared  0.076  
 ρ    
-0.138 
[0.113] 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the sample of households headed by a black individual in Statistics 
South Africa’s GHS 2002 and 2003. ATT = Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Regressors included: 
a dummy variable equal to one if the observation comes from the GHS 2003, and zero if it comes from the 
GHS 2002, and all regressors in Table 3 except the set of household language indicators. Robust standard 
errors in brackets. Matching algorithm is nearest neighbour matching without replacement using psmatch2 
(Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). To further ensure common support, the 2.5% participants at which the 
propensity score density of the controls is lowest were trimmed off. a Balancing property satisfied (the 
smallest p-value for an individual t-test of equality of means in a regressor between treated and controls is 
0.07). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 1: Treatment Effect on the Treated According to 
Expenditure 
Source: LFS September 2002 and GHS 2003. Contrary to the other 
data sets used in this paper, the negative interaction coefficient 
between participation and expenditure per capita is statistically 
significant (at 5% and 1% for LFS 2002 and GHS 2003, 
respectively). Adult-equivalent expenditure per capita in Rand per 
month. Top expenditure percentile omitted. 
 
                                                 
 
